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INTRODUCTION - DECISIONS ON A FUTURE CITY 
- by Lloyd Axworthy 
In a very short time Greater Winnipeg will have a new form of government. 
The provincial cabinet has issued its policy Paper on Local Government Reform 
and has promised to introduce legislation at the forthcoming session. By the new 
year of 1972, this new structure of government will be operational. 
For many citizens of the city this is a welcome occurence. It has become 
clear over the past several years that the existing system of local government was 
not working very well. Incessant name-calling and petty bickering between 
Metro and City officials was an annoying and at times degrading spectacle. More 
serious was the mounting evidence that the faulty, fragmented handling of 
critical urban issues was leading to poor performance in such fields as renewal, 
housing, tax reform, economic growth and development, and community ser-
vices. While the city was slowly_ sinking, the people at the controls spent too 
much time arguing over whose hand "'hould be on the wheel. 
- 1~\ 
It was critical that basic reforms take place, and credit is due the provincial 
government for its initiative. However,. while their proposal deserves applause, it 
equally deserves thoughtful, careful consideration. 
The proposed changes are much too far reaching to be given only cursory 
or superficial examination. After all, the Provincial Government is about to 
introduce legislation that will vitally affect the future of our city. This is not a 
slight amendment with only limited impact. It is a move to fundamentally 
redesign the way that one-half million people will govern themselves for many 
years to come. 
Local government has increasingly become more important in our lives. 
There was a time when it performed limited tasks. It was really not much more 
than a caretalcer; providing basic services and maintenance. That is no longer 
true. Now the role of local government reaches into virtually every phase of life, 
and the decisions made by local government can drastically alter the way we live. 
Just think of the newspaper headlines over the past year to gain some sense of 
the significance of those decisions being made at the local level - a major 
program of downtown development, plans for urban renewal that will affect 
thousands of inner city residents, hundreds of millions proposed for a complex 
urban highway - expressway system and the list could go on. 
The accelerating growth in importance, size of task and impact on people 
of local government is happening right across Canada. Yet while the functions of 
local government multiply and its tasks grow bigger, the capacity of existing 
structures of local government and the abilities of those who operate the struc-
tures have not appeared to keep pace. This is a fact recently documented in a 
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report on urban management by the Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. 
This disparity between what needs to be done and the capacity oflocal gov-
ernment organizations to respond, will become more serious as we move into a 
decade of increasing urbanization and ever-growing complexity of urban life. It has 
been estimated that Greater Winnipeg will reach a population of over 700,000 by 
1985. If one looks at the estimates of the World Health Organization, that for every 
1,000 new people the average North American city requires 
- 382 acres of land for residential development 
- 8.8 acres of school and recreation development space 
- 8.4 school rooms 
- 100,000 extra gallons of water per year 
then one can see that the single job of providing for future physical development 
needs of this city is immense. 
The job of providing for the future city, however, goes beyond require-
ments of physical expansion. People in cities must contend with a host of 
complex issues as they strive to shape a decent life for themselves in an urban 
world. Where to find decent accommodation, the deterioration of the environ-
ment, the dissolution of community and neighbourhood ties, the search for 
choice in recreation and entertainment, these are the kinds of questions posed 
by the fact of urbanization. 
In Greater Winnipeg, there are several specific issues that will stand out as 
a priority. A partial list would be: 
(a) There is a settlement of disillusioned people occupying the central core 
of the city, with more being added every day. They are often the new arrivals from 
the rural areas, coming with expectations for better life, only to find a place on the 
welfare roles. The existing systems of social services, education or government deal 
with them only in a glancing, partial way, their traditional approaches not designed 
to effectively help in the transition to urban life. 
(b) The local tax system provides neither sufficient resources, nor fair 
distribution. It encourages land speculation and discourages rehabilitation. It 
falls unfairly on a large number of wage-earners and creates hardships for the 
elderly landowner. Piecemeal tinkering won't suffice, there mu~t be a major 
overhaul. 
(c) Growth and expansion of the city has been handled in a sporadic, 
often unthinking fashion. We allow the city to sprawl in several different dir-
ections without real rational choice or sense of objective. This results in high 
costs for homes, and too many sub-divisions of undistinguished quality. Large-
scale land assembly by public authority, combined with an efficient transport-
ation network could serve to consolidate the growth areas of the metropolitan 
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region. Mini-town or satellite town development is a way of utilizing cheap land 
and modern technology, to provide low-cost housing in a livable environment. 
(d) The human dimension of city life is too often forgotten. Cities are 
enjoyable and exciting because of the choices they offer, not because of tall 
office buildings, or massive building projects. The scale of development must be 
reduced. Small vest-pocket parks, scattered throughout for old people to sit and 
children to play, open markets for browsing, clusters of specialized restaurants 
and shops, play spaces, squash courts, swimming facilities should be available to 
all people, not just to those who make over $10,000 a year. These are the kinds 
of places that give a city vitality and color. 
The list could be extended. What is important is that the above priorities 
show that a very different kind of local government is needed in order to give 
leadership to this community in finding answers for the future. We cannot 
approach the issues of the next decade with a form of government designed in 
the past. A new set of institutions and a new style of local government are 
necessary to meet the sophisticated, difficult problems of managing the future 
needs of this city. -·~ 
Obviously, then the reform of local government is important to citizens of 
this city. It is important to know what the proposals are, how they might work, 
and if they really will provide us with effective means of government for the 
future. 
There must be wide-spread discussion of these proposals and discussion 
that is knowledgeable. So far, the comment on the proposals have come mainly 
from the aldermen, councillors and mayors of the existing municipalities. That is 
to be expected, and they should be listened to. --
But, they are not the only voices that should be heard in the debate. They 
have a vested interest in what the changes will be, as they stand to either gain or 
lose power, privilege or maybe even office. They cannot be counted on for an 
entirely dispassionate point of view. 
This collection of commentaries is presented in the hope that they will 
help to widen and enrich the debate. The articles in this collection have been 
written by men who are competent in their own field and independent in their 
view. They are interested in what happens to this city, but are not personally 
involved in the existing organization of local·government. 
Their insights and opinions should be of use to those citizens who are also 
interested in what happens to Winnipeg. They are designed to give different 
perspectives, introduce new aspects and make suggestions on how the govern-
ment proposals might be improved. 
This is a time for every citizen of the city to beome fully aware and 
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involved in the decisions that are to take place. The provincial government has 
asked for involve.ment and in their community meetings is actively seeking it. 
After the legislation is introduced in the Spring, there will be a further opport-
unity for a representation of public views. So, hopefully this collection may be a 
spur to thought and perhaps action. The people of this city have the opportunity 
to participate in the shaping of the basic structures that will govern this city in 
the years to come. It is an opportunity that should not be ignored, but should be 
pursued to the fullest with the aim of building a good form of government that 
will well serve our city now and in the future. 
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THE POLICY PAPER IN BRIEF 
-by Jim 
The government, when looking at modern urban community problems 
stresses that "It is the people who make the community - not merely the 
structural forms they have devised over the years to help them accomplish their 
common ends. Structural forms, governmental set-ups, all these things are mean-
ingless except insofar as they serve the people who live within them." The 
government identifies three main roots of internal problems -fragmented auth-
ority, segmented financial capacity, and lack of citizen involvement. The govern-
ment also recognizes that the last of these roots is the most difficult to deal 
with. 
As regards the Boundaries Commission Report, the government while 
agreeing with many of the concepts and principles expressed therein, could not 
find itself in agreement with the major recommendations of it. The primary 
reason for this was that its propos~structures would not, in the eyes of govern-
ment, provide the necessary community level structure through which the 
citizen could gain easy access to all sections of government. 
The government proposed that all major services should be unified but the 
political processes of local government must bedecentralized and brought closer 
to the people. "We wish to make it completely clear, however, that it is the 
absolute conviction of this Government that no attempt at urban reform can 
succeed unless it succeeds in strengthening the sense of identification and intens-
ifying the communication, between the citizen and his local government." 
There has been a trend in recent years towards improving efficiency and qual-
ity of services, on the one hand and making governments more remote from the 
people on he other hand. In light of tllis, the government is proposing that all major 
urban services and fiscal resources be unified under one central council. This coun-
cil will be "so elected and its duties so arranged, as to afford the maximum direct 
contact, communication, and interaction between the citizen and his elected coun-
cillor." 
In order to provide better representation for the people, the government 
proposes that: 
Greater Winnipeg would have a unified council consisting of 48 mem-
bers. 
There would be at least one representative for approximately every 
10,000 people. 
No municipality would have less than three elected representatives. 
Since some municipalities have an insufficient population base to yield 
the three necessary representatives, the following consolidations would 
be made: 
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East Kildonan and North Kildonan 
Charleswood, Tuxedo and Fort Garry 
Old Kildonan and West Kildonan 
Each municipality would be divided into at least 3 and at most 22 wards, which 
would reflect as accurately as possible, not only existing municipal boundaries, 
but also natural and familiar community groupings. 
The new central council would elect from its membership a chairman 
known as the Mayor. This council will be responsible for all major urban services 
and policy decisions. A system of committees is proposed in order to facilitate 
the council's decision-making and the policy execution role. Four major commit-
tees have been proposed; an Executive Committee make up fo the Mayor, the 
chairman of the other three committees and three other members elected at 
large; a Committee on Planning and Development, on Works and Operations and 
a Committee on Finance. The Executive Committee would, in fact, be the major 
policy and decision-making authority. 
The administrative body - Board of Commissioners- would be the focal 
link between the council and the administration. It would be composed of senior 
civil servants dealing with the Council's committees, the Mayor and a Chairman. No 
method of appointment is made clear in the report. The Board would make recom-
mendations on all matters concerning the carrying out of the executive and admin-
istrative functions and would be responsible to the central council for general man-
agement, direction and control of the city's administration. 
The Community Committee concept grew out of the desire to devise at the 
community level a framework within which the citizen could clearly perceive the 
issues affecting him and act forcefully and effectively in his own self-interest. 
There will be eight Community Committees, one for each municipality and each 
will have at least three councillors. The Community Committees will be local 
committees of the Greater Winnipeg Council and will be responsible for local 
services itt their immediate area. Each councillor elected from a local ward would 
become automatically and simultaneously a member of the municipal Com-
munity Committee and a member of the Greater Winnipeg Council. In this way 
he would have two roles, one being a member of the executive decision body 
and the other being the access vehicle through which people could reach the 
local government system. The Committees would have no law-making or fiscal 
powers or collective bargaining role with regard to the provision'bbf services for 
which they are responsible. 
Each Committee would have a dual role, an administrative, and a com-
munitative one, with the latter being of a more important, permanent and stable 
nature. It is suggested that the Committee could best achieve this communic-
ation between citizens, politicians and officials by forming aggregations of 3 to 6 
wards and therefore three to six councillors representing natural community 
lines. 
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As regards representation and access of the people to the levels of govern-
ment problems could arise in the smaller communities if their elected councillors 
were appointed as Mayor, or members of Executive Council. For example, a 
Mayor who is a councillor from Transcona, would be Chairman of the Central 
Council, member of the Executive Committee, member of the Board of Com-
missioners: member of the Community Committee, and he would still be expect-
ed to be available to the people -a virtual impossibility. 
Because local government does not exist in a vacuum, the provincial gov-
ernment will find it necessary to effect, at their level, a parallel and complement-
ary reorganization. In order to create clarity and coherence in the division of 
authority between the two levels of government the province will create a single 
focus, a minister responsible for urban affairs. The minister will administer the 
Act establishing the new local government and co-ordinate and improve the 
performance of the provinical government in its relationship with the Greater 
Winnipeg Region. The government also supports the stated federal intent to 
co-ordinate federal roles affecting the cities and urge a substantial increase in the 
level of federal support for urbaJJ. development. 
As regards the jurisd:Ctiori~~~lationships between the three levels of gov-
ernment, there is a need for ascertaining quickly who, at which level of govern-
ment is doing what and how it is affecting whom in what way. To do this they 
propose to develop and apply a system of urban accounts which would record all 
public activities in the Greater Winnipeg Re~ion. These urban accounts would 
serve as a means of evaluating programs as to consistency and standards. They 
will record the level and quality of the programs being provided and analyze the 
effects of these programs on the urban environment and the people in it. These 
urban reports in addition to being a basic reference point for inter-governmental 
relations would also become a major stimulus to public information and dis-
cussion. 
During the period of transition, the Minister and the Cabinet Committee 
would meet with members of the new regional council to execute smoothly the 
transition process. The Cabinet Committee will be supported by technical staff 
from both provincial and local jurisdictions and will ensure that proper consult-
ation is carried out with the organizations involved in the transition. 
The government proposals include an equalization of mill rates throughout 
the Greater Winnipeg Area. The government intends to proceed with an equal-
ization of the municipal mill rate, although an alternative involving an additional 
partial equalization of the education mill rate is also being considered. The 
"few" municipalities that would experience an increase in taxes because of this 
move would have that increase subsidized by the government at the rate of 
two-thirds of the increase the first year and one-half the increase the second 
year. 
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A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROPOSALS 
( 1) Access and Opportunity for citizen involvement and participation 
( 2) 48 member executive central council 
( 3) Mayor of Central Council elected by councillors 
( 4) 6 member executive committee 
( 5) 8 community committees 
( 6) Dual role for councillors 
( 7) Council Commissioner administrative system 
( 8) Equalization of mill rates 
( 9) Provincial Minister of Urban Affairs 
(10) Implementation date of January 1, 1972. 
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A Comparison of the Government of Manitoba and 
Local Government Boundaries Commission reports dealing 
with reorganization of Local Government in the 
Greater Winnipeg Area. 
-by David G. Henderson, MArch., (C.P.) 
The Provisional Plan for Local Government Units in the Greater Winnipeg 
Area as prepared by the Local Government Boundaries Commission and the 
Government of Manitoba Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater 
Winnipeg Area, (referred to as the Policy Statement), were prepared within 
different terms of reference, with different motives, and with divergent objec-
tives. To compare the two reports is to attempt to compare apples and oranges. 
The Provisional Plan of the Commission was designed to engender discus-
sion and reaction with respect to local government in the Metropolitan Winnipeg 
area for the next 10 - 20 year;;. Under the terms of the Local Government 
Bou~darie~ Commissio~ . Ac;l, puj~ic hear~gs are requi:ed to be he~d in con-
nectiOn With the Provisional PI~- and pnor to any fmal plan which would 
recognize all submissions and reflect the best advice and information presented 
to the Commission. The letter of transmittal on page 5 of the Provisional Plan 
report states, "If public discussion of this Provisional Plan will bring to light 
principles or facts which were not considered,--they will be studied and carefully 
reviewed by the Commission before preparing the final plan." 
The preamble to the Policy Statement of the Government of Manitoba 
expresses the hope that it "will provide a basis for wide-spread public discussion 
and debate, prior to legislation being introduced at the next session of the 
Legislature."! 
The initial comparison, if one can be made, is that the Commission chose 
to review local government and any reorganization of same from the point of 
view of the long term possibility of strengthening and enhancing the principle of 
self-government. As further stated on page 10 .of the Provisional Plan; "Change 
should not be made simply for the sake of change; rather, changes should be 
made only for the purpose of achieving definite benefits." 
The Policy Statement of the (}overnment on the other hand states that 
"this area now lacks the governmental structure to make it an effectively func-
tioning entity;"2 and "the nature of the community has changed so radically 
that the familiar and traditional structures, which in the case of Greater Win-
nipeg served it well in its early stages of growth, can no longer meet the demands 
now placed upon them" .3 Also, in reference to Greater Winnipeg, "it has be-
come the greatest single repository of social ills within the Province."3 These 
and other observations expressed throughout the paper strongly emphasize that 
conditions, in the opinion of the Government, are in such a state that a major 
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restructuring of local government and the creation of a new administrative and 
development mechanism is essential to the welfare of the Greater Winnipeg area. 
The Commission, which observed that the current two-tier structure oflocal 
government could be greatly improved through legislation and relatively little dis-
ruption of existing units of local government, did not share the same concern with 
respect to the capacity of Greater Winnipeg to accommodate the demands likely to 
be generated by urban growth. The Commission did not overlook the fact that local 
self-government is languishing. However, upon review of the varying points of view 
with respect to the relevancy of local government, the Commission came to the 
conclusion that "local self-government must be preserved and strengthened; the 
trend toward centralization must not be allowed to swallow up and obliterate truly 
local self-government. That is not to say that an area-wide authority is not essential 
for some services that are area wide in nature. The Commission is concerned that 
the administrations of local government units be kept to a manageable size, both 
from the point of view of the elected representatives to whom the Administrations 
are responsible, and from the point of view of citizens who must deal with the 
Administrations in connection with various and sundry services."4 The Commis-
sion therefore determined on the basis of study of current problems with respect to 
Metro and other municipal governments, that the need for a dramatic change in 
local government was not proven. Perhaps submissions at future public hearings 
would have produced evidence to the contrary and thus would have influenced the 
recommendations of any Final Plan. This was certainly the experience with respect 
to the production of the Commission's Final Plan for an Education System in Man-
itoba. 
The Policy Statement of the Government on the other hand records sub-
stantial disagreement with the conclusions of the Commission and states, " ... we 
find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with the Commission over what the 
critical problems, those most urgently in need of solution, in fact are."S In effect, 
the Government of Manitoba sees the need for immediate reform of local govern-
ment requiring a new political and administrative structure. 
Herein lies the crunch. The Commission· reviewed the current status of 
local government and found it wanting with respect to representation by local 
authorities on the metro authority; a clear delineation of functions and respons-
ibilities between levels of government; a degree of over-representation and at the 
same time lack of accountability by elected officials tQ, the electorate; and the 
need for a new approach to renewal and development of the central core area. 6 
However, it concluded that the apparent problems could be rectified with little 
disruption of the present two-tier structure of local government. In fact, on page 
66 of its Provisional Plan, the Commission states; "The Commission believes that 
radical changes would be worse than no changes at all." 
On the other hand, the Government of Manitoba has produced a statement 
of policy to be expressed in the form of legislation within two to three months 
of release. The Government appears to be of the opinion that there is urgency 
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with. respect to t~e restructuring of local government if the Greater Winnipeg 
area IS to develop man orderly and efficient manner.? 
Two points of view, two conflicting opinions. 
Strangely enough, both the Government and the Commission appear to 
agree on a number of concepts and principles. As stated in the Government 
Policy Statement, "it (the Government) shares the Commission's concern that a 
close~ relationship exist between the citizen and his local government and con-
curs m the guidelines which the Commission set out for itself in this regard: 
'Local Government is a means of effective 
communication between citizens and their 
elected representatives of all levels of govern-
ment.' 
The Government also agrees with the Commission's recommendation that 
local gover~ment representation_ be based on a system of wards comprising some 
1 0,00~ r~si~ents each, and;:in th~;eonnection what is of particular interest is the 
CommiSsion s statement: -~-
The Concept of neighbourhood, borough or 
ward councils, which underpin the Council 
of the Municipal unit of JVhich the neigh-
bourhoods, and wards are segments and 
which are given limited and particularly local 
powers and responsibilities to exercise and 
execute; this concept can be incorporated in-
to any local structure.8 
The _c~mmission had considered the neighbourhood council or ward sys-
tem futunstlc but possibly one which could evolve under the recommended 
Regional Government plus Nine City Plan or future amalgamations of a number 
of those cities.9 
It is at t~is point that the Government expressed another point of view, 
namely that this concept of neighbourhood councils was modern and functional 
in the context of the Twentieth Century urban complex.lO 
Again- two different points of view. Two conflicting opinions. 
The Government recognized the value of the research and data produced 
by t_he Con:mission.ll This research was developed by the Commission in prep-
aratiOn for Its study of the question of the optimal structure of local government 
for the Greater Winnipeg area. As stated on page 30 of the Provisional Plan '~The Commission was ever mindful of the danger of coming to a hasty conclu~ 
s10n based on nothing more than hunch, supposition, guesswork and vague gen-
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eralities." The research included appraisal of the social, economic and physical 
aspects of the Greater Winnipeg area as well as study of the factors which are 
likely to apply and affect the cost of any amalgamation. The latter study ident-
ified a number of factors which are likely to affect costs of any amalgamation. 
Regardless of the scale of an amalgamation, the distribution of local and area-
wide functions are of less significance than their social value. For instance, the 
significance of services delivered at the local level can be such that the costs can 
be ignored while area-wide services will be required regardless of the cost, simply 
to guarantee their provision. The specific factors which were identified by the 
Commission as likely to affect cost over the initial ten years of amalgamation 
were as follows: 
First: Services are demanded by and will continue to be demanded by people, 
such services being local in nature and with which citizens can identify 
and in which they want to be involved. These services are local and as 
such not critical to the capactiy of the total urban area to function 
effectively. 
Second: Services which are critical to the holding together of the total urban 
structure and involve inputs of the total community as well as senior 
levels of government. 
These factors represent nothing more than maintenance of the status quo, the 
estimated costs of which were estimated in relation to an eight-city, three-city 
and one-city concept with anticipated distributions of functions in each case. 
The study found that the costs of upgrading salaries to that of the predominant 
unit of any amalgamation plus current total expenditures and the possible add-
itional expenditures resulting from distribution of functions was measurable and 
that these would be costs directly related to the scale of amalgamation. 
Third: The study also identified the possibility of inputs required to offset the 
> inefficiencies and deficiencies in standard of service which will only 
become a factor as amalgamations take place. 
Fourth: In addition it identified the tendency for any new unit of local govern-
ment to upgrade services throughout its jurisdiction to a standard equal 
to at least that considered desireable to present day requirements. 
These four factors were considered to be measurable and llkely to come 
into prominance during the intial years of amalgamation (3-4 years). 
However, the study also identified two other factors which cannot now be 
measured in terms of cost. 
Fifth: The degree to which future decision-makers may be inclined to raise the 
level of standard of service beyond the initial up-grading, due to new 
leadership, resource, population and value characteristics at that time as 
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opposed to the present. 
Sixth: The massive input which will be required to meet the major needs of 
the society of tomorrow, an input beyond the capacity of local or 
regional governments. While this input will be influenced by Federal 
and Provincial requirements in the area of urban development, the de-
gree of financial input by these authorities cannot be determined. 
The study concludes that the anticipated input required in order to main-
tain the status quo, make up deficiencies, raise the level of service and deal with 
urbanization are in part, inevitable, but will be felt much sooner by the total 
community if any amalgamations which occur are other than minor. 
The Commission's study which included a substantial review of all liter-
ature dealing with costs of amalgamation and optimum size of cities, found no 
real evidence that large amalgamations produced efficiencies and economies of 
scale. On the contrary, the evidence tended to indicate otherwise. 
Therefore, the Comm1ssio~pon review of cost data relevant to the Great-
er Winnipeg situation, concluded1fl.at costs would result from amalgamation and 
while certain that these were measurable and might be controlled to a degree, 
the evidence was to the effect that the greater the degree of amalgamation, the 
greater and sooner the costs to by met by the citizens of the Community. The 
Study also observed that there was no evidence that the resource base of the 
community would increase as a result of amalgamation, certainly not to the 
same degree as likely costs. 
The Government Policy Statement could not accept what it refers to as 
the premises and assumptions of the Commission with respect "to costs and the 
methods by which the common goal of heightened citizen participation in local 
government can be achieved."10 However, here the comparison ends for the 
Policy Statement does not produce any evidence or arguments to counter the 
findings of the Commission's research. 
The major recommendations of the comrrusswn which call for more 
strength in the Regional Authority (Metro), greater accountability to the elector-
ate by locally elected officials, a clearer definition of the distribution of area 
wide and local functions, and representation on the Regional Authority by the 
local municipalities were not acceptable to the Government. This in spite of the 
fact that in principle they agree on the need to improve the quality of local 
government as well as the capacity of citizens of Greater Winnipeg to have an 
effective say in the policies and programs which affect them. 
The Government Paper proposes to unify all major urban services, and all 
fiscal resources at the disposal of the community, under one central council. A 
system of wards grouped into Community Committees is proposed to afford 
citizen participation in local functions and affairs. A restructuring of the admin-
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istration of municipal government is also proposed. When implemented, Greater 
Winnipeg will operate under a new form of local government, the important 
by-product of which will be the closer relationship between citizens and their 
local government.12 As stated in the Government Policy Statement, "The im-
portant point, however, is that the avenues of political access will have been 
opened, and if openness is exhibited, citizens, m our view, will respond." 13 The 
Government is also of the view that "the proposed urban reforms afford a 
unique opportunity to call forth and to put to best community use the tremen-
dous integral (but now latent and dormant) strength which lies in true com-
munity identification." 14 
The Commission agrees that these suggested results can be achieved 
through reorganization of units of local government. However, it does not agree 
with creation of centralized municipal government and administration and by 
virtue of its recommendations for a stronger Regional Authority and the oper-
ation of nine municipalities within the Metro area, gives weight to its conviction 
that "the implementation of its (The Commission's) recommendations will not 
only strengthen local government in Metropolitan Winnipeg and equip it to cope 
with the challenges of the future, but also the implementation of its recommend-
ations will generate the kind of co-operative yet diverse urban situation that will 
make the Metropolitan Winnipeg area a significant urban center of the world." 15 
What do you think? 
The Commission produced a report and supporting evidence in which it 
concluded that reform of local government in Greater Winnipeg should evolve 
under a two-tier system of government in as much as evidence indicated that the 
factors which will influence the costs of major reforms may well come into play 
and in fact not justify the benefits such reform is purported to offer.16 
The government is of the opinion that the assumptions and concerns of 
the Commission are not on sound ground and that the benefits of the reform 
proposed by Government will far exceed any costs or inconvenience. 
Time will tell. 
One wonders, however, had the Commission's Provisional Plan been the 
subject of public hearings and a Final Plan produced prior to release of the 
Government's Policy Statement, would the final recommendati6ns have pro-
duced verification of the Commission's original conclusions, a further alter-
native, or confirmation that the public indeed preferred the one city concept? 
We will never know. 
14-
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Issue-Handling, 
The Division of Powers, 
And the Quality of Government 
In The New Urban Community 
- by Philip H Wichern, Jr. 
Amongst this last year's Christmas gifts was one given by the Manitoba 
Government to all of us who are residents of the Greater Winnipeg area: a new 
system of local government. In this brief inspection, I will attempt to examine 
this new system in terms of three basic questions: How capable will the system 
be in handling the issues emerging in urban areas of this size? What are the 
implications of the new division of powers between tiers in the system? And, 
finally, to what degree will the new scheme actually be an improvement as a 
local governing unit? In the interest of clarity, I will devote a section to each of 
these questions. 
I. Issues 
Any urban government must be judged first and foremost on its ability to 
meet the needs of the people within its boundaries in the most representative 
and efficient way possible. This means that it is able to handle issues and resolve 
conflicts which arise within those boundaries, as well as to marshall the resources 
necessary to make the process viable. 
It used to be tl;tat this problem was solvable at the local level by authorities 
independent of each other. However, the White Paper is quite correct in describ-
ing these times as related to a previous age of small-scale issues and conflicts: 
Greater Winnipeg is no longer a fron-
tier town. It is no longer an agglomeration of 
village communities formed in the interest of 
convenience and basic service needs in a pri-
marily agrarian environment. It has become 
an industrial complex . . . in almost ever 
sense, a modern urban city in a modern, 
technology-oriented environment. (White 
Paper, page 31) 
A primary change, the world over, is the trend toward an increasing scale 
of interdependent economic and social activities based on the organizational 
integration of human resources and nonhuman energy -and machinery. In this 
technological environment, we live and work in "a vast complex, and completely 
interdependent process" (Greer, page 43). Sometimes we forget that our lives are 
much more dependent upon social control and order than was the case a short 
number of years ago. For example, we save, shop, get paid through a system of 
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banking accounts, credit cards, and a complex network of financial transactions. 
Similarly, we drive to work across the city, dine in another part of town, see a 
show in another, and attend our favorite clubs in yet another. 
The consequences of this environment for local government have been 
enormous. The needs and issues which used to be distributed in various urban 
villages now spill over and overlap traditional jurisdictions. Recall, for example, 
the increase in scale of public safety problems - the demands placed on police 
and fire services these days. In addition, a whole new set of issues has accompan-
ied the technological-industrial evolution: competition for attracting industrial 
development in municipalities, costs of expanding and increasingly demanded 
public services of higher quality at the local level (remember the outdoor privy, 
coal burner, and dreyman?), pollution, planning, etc. 
The Manitoba Boundary Commission recognized this challenge of emerg-
ing issues in its report: 
The Metropolitan Winnipeg area, sim-
ilar to other i~ge urban centres is faced 
with a w!denin\lrange of proble~s such as 
expansion of municipal services and prov-
ision of new services, the provision of ade-
quate housing, the achievement of intelligent 
siting and initiation of . . .:,. (land) ... dev-
elopment . . . and the foresight to obviate 
potential traffic congestion ... (as well as 
problems related to) ... the adequate use of 
leisure time by people in all age groups, a 
greater degree of protection for the air, 
water, and land resources of the area, a 
greater capacity to manage and control large 
masses of people in an area when civil dis-
obedience and demonstration appear to be 
on an increase ... (etc.). (Commission, page 
29) 
Given the change in the nature of the community in which we live, and the 
corresponding change in the nature of the issues confronting local governments 
in urban areas, can these problems be most efficiently handled in a democratic 
(participative) framework of many local governments. The Boundary Commis-
sion has said "yes". The experience of North America (and metropolitan centres 
around the world), and the opinion of the White Paper is a definite "no": 
The Greater Winnipeg area has this in 
common with a great many urban centres in 
North America - the· nature of the com-
munity has changed so radically that the 
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familiar and traditional structures, which in 
the case of Greater Winnipeg served it so 
well in its early stages_ of growth, can no 
longer meet the demands now placed on 
them ... Every citizen of Greater Winnipeg, 
regardless of where he lives in the com-
munity, is familiar with the result. Streets 
have become increasingly entrenched and 
more difficult to deal with, and housing 
more expensive and difficult to obtain ... 
. . . the problems and difficulties of 
the urban community transcend jurisdictions 
and boundary lines. Yet the effective power 
to deal with these problems has been, and is, 
sharply delineated and circumscribed. (White 
Paper, page 2) 
This position may not seem at first to be defensible to the citizen who has not 
attempted to get zoning changes, building permits, accident reports, etc. How-
ever, the more one is involved in day-to-day urban problems, the less relevant 
and more unjustifiable existing jurisdictions become. Still, most citizens will be 
familiar with the Metro-municipal conflict which has impeded policy coordin-
ation in such important areas as urban renewal and industrial plant location. 
If the existing structures and services are not combined, further situations 
may develop· for which the Winnipeg area is not prepared. For example, one of 
the strategist-activist members of the FLQ was from this area. Suppose a wide-
spread attempt at disruption, from whatever source, occurred in Winnipeg. How 
could the issues in such a situation be handled with less than one government 
and one police force? The present system demonstrates the limits, as well as 
extent, of informal cooperation as a device of urban policy. 
The White Paper would place all major services under the control of a unified 
Council, with a Commission form of administration responsible to the Council 
through policy committees. This is by far the most reasonable proposal to solve the 
issue-handling problem. The two-tier system simply does not provide the unified 
authority which centralizes administration of services. At the same time, the White 
Paper provides for Community Committees to supervise the delivery of services in 
local areas and to serve as communication centres for citizens wishingto participate 
in making public policy for their own, or the whole, area. The locally (ward) elect-· 
ed councilmen would represent these interest, but within a policy-making frame-
work which gives them a much more sufficient resource base and policy scope (the 
whole urban community). Within this framework they are more likely to see local 
issues in the light of the whole urban area, rather than simply in terms of the area 
within their Community Committee boundaries. 
This, it seems to me, is the best way of handling the types of issues which are 
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emerging in urban areas in North America, and the prognosis for. the proposed 
system in this regard would seem to be excellent. 
II. Division of Powers 
Our second question is "what are the implications of the division of 
powers between tiers in the new system?" The reader will recall that the unified 
Council is given authority over all major services in terms of revenues and alloc-
ations, law-making, and hiring and firing employees. The Community Com-
mittees are given administrative and limited allocative powers: 
A number of services will remain at 
the local level. It will be the function of the 
Community Committees to administer these 
services ... 
It will also be the function of the 
Committees to administer those services gen-
erally deemed. to be essentially local in nat-
ure sucH: as cBimunity centres, local parks, 
playgrounds, ]f)raries and recreational facil-
ities. 
With regard to those services now 
provided by the area municipalities which 
will ... continue to be a le~cal responsibility, 
the Community Committees would have 
authority to: 
(1) consider and propose programs with 
respect to these services; 
(2) submit to the Central Council the pro-
posed budgets for these services; and 
(3) supervise delivery of these services. 
Amounts would be allocated from the 
overall budget ... for the specified programs 
in each Committee area ... The sum alloc-
ated would be a lump sum covering all such 
programs and in this way permit local flex-
ibility in allocation of expenditures. 
The Central Council could delegate to 
the Community Committee the authority to 
negotiate contracts for works maintenance 
projects . . . within limits of the approved 
budget . · . . (but not for ... any new con-
struction or public works projects ... 
The Communtiy Committees would 
have no legal authority over hiring or firing 
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of personnel at the community level, but 
would have the power to direct and assign 
local staff. (White Paper, pages 19-20) 
From this rather lengthy quotation, the reader may surmise that only the 
policy-making scraps have gone to the Community Committees. They have 
neither fiscal, law-making, or collective bargaining powers. They must find their 
power base in supervisory authority over personnel, limited allocation power 
over facilities, and contracts to keep up existing public works. 
Compared with the well-organized Commissioner form of administration 
which is also proposed, the Community Committees have little actual power. 
The hand on the purse usually calls the political shots, and that hand is defin-
itely the Central Council-Administration in this case. Only through their pos-
itions on the Central Council and its committees can the local community repre-
sentatives make their wishes known to local public servants, unless some further 
mechanism is created by which public service employees are directly responsible 
to the representatives. As the system stands, the employees will be responsible to 
their superiors in the central administration upon who they depend for pay, 
advancement, pension, etc. 
In other words, the exact extent of the powers given to the Community 
Committees is questionable. Without the basis for power, can there be an effec-
tive control over little more than existing public works, city halls, libraries, 
parks, and recreational facilities? If authority is taken, who does the public 
employee obey: the local politician or his superior in the central administration? 
Under these conditions can Community Committees be said to "administer these 
services"? 
In this system, it may be much more difficult for local residents to get 
changes in the administration or delivery of public services than is now the case. 
Because the local representative is one out of 48, and the Community Commit-
tee members anywhere from three to eight of the same number, the new system 
may not be expected to provide the same results many citizens now get when 
they call their alderman for specific things which they need. 
Just how demands are channelled and handled will depend upon the organ-
ization of the representatives as they form the Central Council, dt.e. whether 
parties or factions dominate. Also an important, but somewhat unpredictable, 
factor is the working relationship which develops between the members of the 
Council and the administrative personnel in the centralized public service. 
Chances are that the days of direct local representation of demands (what the 
Boundary Commission calls "self-government") are at an end - a sacrifice to the 
broader framework in which the area-wide issues may be properly handled. 
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III. An Improvement? 
We have discussed both issue-handling and division of powers. My analysis 
indicates a major step forward in issue-handling at the expense of the traditional 
consumer representation which the municipal councilmen have come to repre-
sent. On balance, is this new system an improvement in local government? 
The answer is "yes" because the new system allows for participation of a 
new type of Winnipeg residents. The Central Council representatives are elected 
by wards. The wards are relatively small and homogeneous in composition of 
population. Ethnic and other groups should have a much better opportunity to 
elect representatives and make their wishes known on area-wide issues, as well as 
burning local issues. 
In addition, representatives are required to report to their constituents and 
consult with them in formal community meetings. For local amenities- public 
works, libraries, recreational programs and parks - as well as the larger issues of 
area-wide significance, the representative is forced toward more accountability 
to the people he represents:: ,(~~ 
The distinct (and intended) possibility of political parties at the local level 
may enliven what has seemed a dead political process, and may instill broad 
policy outlines on a currently fragmented and ad hoc-oriented policy process. In 
addition, the new system may 
... create, at the local level, the climate in 
which citizen interest, participation and 
active involvement can, and will, flourish ... 
(White Paper, page 18) 
As the White Paper notes, the manner in which people respond will depend upon 
a number of factors. One is "the existing community patterns ( of political 
activity) within a given area". Another factor will be "how individual councillors 
use the opportunity to achieve a heightened relationship to their constituents". 
The White Paper is optimistic about the first factor: " ... citizens, in our view, 
will respond." 
The second factor is not commented on in the paper, but is perhaps the 
more crucial. Any government's quality depends primarily on the quality of the 
men who govern. In the case of the new system, this is especially important since 
they must decide the crucial issues of how to provide the various services at 
reasonable costs on a metropolitan wide basis. Instead of 112 officials in 13 
fragmented jurisdictions, the 48 new councillors will hold the power of govern-
ing this area. 
In the end, the quality of government under the new system will depend, 
as it should, on the quality of the men who are elected by us. In this respon-
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sibility lies the unique challenge which we as citizens have set before us by this 
innovation. My opinion is that Greater Winnipeg residents can and will meet this 
challenge. If we do not, it will not be because the Provincial government has not 
given us the incentive and framework in its Christmas gift. 
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EFFICIENCY, RESPONSIVENESS AND THE CIVIC SERVICE 
- by Professor Jim McNiven 
"One result (of new local government forms elsewhere) has been, almost 
consistently, to achieve the desired improvement in efficiency and quality of 
services. But there is now clear evidence of another result as well -a significant 
loss of public responsiveness and civic involvement." 
(Proposals for Urban Reorganization 
in the Greater Winnipeg Area, p. 19) 
EFFICIENCY 
The seeming incompatibility of administrative efficiency and citizen res-
ponsiveness is noted by the provincial government as the critical question faced 
in its attempt to restructure urban government in the Winnipeg area. One part of 
t~e question, that ?f rai~g .{~-level of administrative efficiency, is in f~ct 
lightly passed over m the Wh1te\Paper. The government, though perhaps w1th 
good reason, never addressed itself to the question of whether amalgamation 
would contribute to the solution of those urban problems which it sees as 
needing solutions in the 1970's. These are: 
a) The separation of planning and development powers 
b) The fragmentation of resources and decision-making power 
c) Disparities in levels of services 
d) Distortions in tax bases and in the distribution of tax revenues 
e) Concentration of social problems in an area which is unable to solve them 
by itself 
f) Exploitation of the core area by the rest of the city 
g) Citizen frustration due to this fragmentation 
One reason why the provincial government can easily assume that amalg-
amation would solve the important city problems of the present is because it has 
identified them as being basically due to fragmentation of finances, urban soc-
iety and political power. There is a large element of circular reasoning on this 
point in the White Paper. The major problems being defined as those related to 
fragmentation leads naturally to the assumption that amalgamation will solve 
these major problems. A second reason underlying this and many other ques-
tions ignored by the White Paper, is that the experience of other cities and 
regions overwhelmingly indicates that larger units tend to be more efficient and, 
what is perhaps more important, more able to tackle those problems which are 
multifaceted. A local development authority, for instance, may be able to pro-
vide adequate public housing, but without some co-ordinated assistance from 
employment and social service agencies, such projects soon turn into brick and 
glass slums, only physically better than those which were razed in the first place. 
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Efficiency implies an increase in output per unit of input. A man who 
produces twice as much as another at the same salary is said to be the more 
efficient of the two. The same analysis must be applied to a unified civic service; 
however when one approaches cost-benefit analysis in relation to urban pro-
grams it is easier to estimate costs than benefits, because the major. portion of 
the costs can be gained from budget projection. 
The Local Government Boundaries Commission attempted to estimate the 
costs of various services based on various plans for urban reorganization. In the 
body of its Report the Commission adopted a general tone that a single city plan 
was more expensive and that even if it were not it should still not be implement-
ed. Its projections given in the appendices to the Report were constructed in 
such a manner as to make it difficult to arrive at a comparison of one-city costs 
with those of the preferred nine-city plan. It would appear though, that total 
amalgamation of all services except education would cost, according to the 
Report, approximately $2.27 million, or 5.6% more than the nine-city plan, 
including an equalization of services in both plans. Compared with actual 1969 
figures (those used as the basis of the Report's projections), even after equaliz-
ation of services, the one-city plan would cost but $1.71 million more, an 
increase of 4.1 %. A later prediction by one of the Commission's members that 
the costs of amalgamation would be $18 to $20 million are not substantiated by 
the research of the Commission itself. The cost of urban services in 1969 was 
about $78 per capita; this would rise to $82 under amalgamation if the Commis-
sion is correct. For $4 per person, the structural tools necessary for a concerted 
and systematic attact on the more tenacious urban problems may be purchase 
and used. 
The non-recurring costs of amalgamation are for the most part not quan-
tifiable. Each functioning organization must be considered as an asset to its 
community and the disruption of the organizations may lead to costs which are 
effectively "hidden" in the organization. If such disruption is gradual and min-
imal in scope, this asset may be retained for the benefit of tl1e whole Greater 
Winnipeg area. Other non-recurring costs, including hiring and transfer of em-
ployees and supervisory personnel, rearrangement expansion of facilities may be 
completed relatively easily and at low cost. Such reorganization need not be 
financially costly. Larger governments and corporations almost continually ex-
perience such shifts without appreciable extra expense. 
Structural efficiency may be paralled by operating efficiency; though the 
two are not necessarily connected. Large bureaucracies, in spite of North Amer-
ican prejudices and Parkinson's Law, are not by definition inefficient. If they 
were, they would be good reason for dismantling such corporations as General 
Motors which employs twice as many people as the Canadian federal service and 
handles nearly as much money as all levels of Canadian government combined. 
Operational efficiency in public bureaucracies has been challenged primarily 
because, unlike private organization, governments have until recently been un-
able to find any reliable measure of performance which comes close to that of 
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"profit". The White Paper has intelligently presumed that the use of planning-
programming techniques and by implication, the managerial styles which are 
associated with them, will be central to the operation of the unified civic service. 
Similar operational reforms have been instituted in the federal government at the 
federal level and are in the process of being implemented at th~ provincial level 
in Manitoba as well. 
RESPONSIVENESS 
Unfortunately, heightened citizen responsiveness is considerably more dif-
ficult to realize than administrative efficiency. Responsiveness is the result of 
individual calculations of experiences, hopes and fears. A lack of it, or apathy, is 
endemic in society as well as its political institutions. Many individuals spend 
most of their working lives in situations where initiative, concern and indepen-
dent thought and action are impossible because of the nature of their jobs and it 
is foolish to expect them to act otherwise outside, of their work. Those who take 
an interest in social activity may be preoccupied by non-governmental concerns; 
they may be active in a church, or obsessed by their businesses or hobbies. Still 
others are actively alienated fri..Pt government, because of a commitment to 
ideologies, bad experiences witli-,overnmental agencies or due to an inability to 
understand how the "system" might be used in their favour. In the final analysis, 
only a small minority will express a continual interest in governmental matters 
and a larger minority will sporadically involve themselves in important public 
issues, if only to the extent of voting. 
There are two levels at which responsiveness must be pursued by an amalg-
amated city government. These are at the level of citizen-administrator contact 
and at the level of general policy implementation. 
Citizen-Administrator Contact 
The first level involves every voter in the city since they all have some 
contact with city services and agents every day. Water and electricity supplies, 
police and fire protection, roads and bridges are only some of the "products" of 
urban government and the nature of the contact between the individual and 
these products and their producers is critical in the development of underlying 
attitudes toward city government. These attitudes do not consist of a rejection 
or acceptance of one set of officials as opposed to another but are oriented 
toward the nature of government itself. Both the White Paper and the Bound-
aries Commission Report noted that such an orientation existed in negative sense 
towards Metro. Both documents tended to ascribe this feeling to the remoteness 
of the Metro decision-making apparatus from the people; one councillor repre-
senting 50,000 people. A second reason which is at least as important, is that the 
contact of nearly all residents with Metro has consisted only of contact with the 
"products" which, if good, tend to be ignored and if bad, were cursed. The only 
exception to this administrative remoteness was the contact between the minor-
ity who ride buses and the drivers of these vehicles. This is tenuous contact 
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indeed, though due credit must be given to these men. Contacts with local 
government are more substantial. Police and firemen, refuse collectors, library 
and social service personnel are crucial in developing positive or negative orient-
ations toward city governments. 
Contact between citizens and governmental personnel are therefore more 
crucial than between these same people and the products of the government, 
assuming these are provided at an acceptable level of quality. Normally such a 
level is easy to attain by any form of urban government and citizens know this; 
therefore they tend to t!lke such services for granted. The jmportance of the 
experiences of individuals with government employees implies that a responsive 
citizenry is to a great extent the result of an administration which is in turn 
responsive to it on a day-to-day level. Within broad limits, such responsiveness is 
divorced from the types of policies which are implemented; the style of admin-
istrative activity being generally more important than its content. Too often 
administrators concentrate on the provision of efficient service without giving 
due consideration to the attitudinal effects produced by those officials directly 
in contact with the public. 
The key to successful amalgamation in the long run will probably be the 
success with which this responsiveness is built into the civic service. The troubles 
which afflict other large cities may be traced in part to a lack of this type of 
responsiveness. Administrators including police, have tended to ignore neigh-
bourhood sensibilities and preferences, thus fostering a growing sense of alien-
ation, especially among residents of core areas and within racial or linguistic 
minorities. Such developments may be easily avoided but the tendency to stress 
organizational prerogatives at the expense of such public needs, has led admin-
istrators to resist satisfactory solutions and encourage unpleasant political 
action, which is generally visited upon the elected leadership. 
An important area inside Greater Winnipeg where such unresponsiveness 
might make itself felt is in what is called "old" St. Boniface, where a majority of 
French descent has in recent years managed to reassert its presence in local 
affairs. The proclivity of those who drew up the White Paper towards rationality 
in administrative amalgamation regardless of any attendant political irrationality, 
has already resulted in an uproar sparked primarily out of fear in this group for 
the survival of what is left of francophone culture in the area. Little has been 
done to point out the positive potential which amalgamation migh have for this 
area and no assurance has been given that symbols such as bilinguaYsigns, police 
contact and official. notices will be even maintained. In fact, within a centralized 
and rational civic service, these would probably be unjustified because of their 
extra expense. 
St. Boniface is not the only area of Greater Winnipeg which might generate 
a positive antagonism toward a centralized civic service, though other areas 
would probably have grievances in other aspects of administration rather than 
language and culture. Some problems may be overcome, especially in police 
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work, by assigning officers to areas where they reside so that positive contact 
and responsiveness may be reinforced. Others may be overcome through close 
administrative liaison with the proposed Community Committees, especially if 
these Committees were augmented by the election of extra members to them. 
The tension between administrative efficiency and responsiveness at the personal 
level will be continuous, however, and it would be best to build safeguards for 
the public into the legislation at the beginning if Winnipeg is not to become a 
well-administered but homogeneous and apathetic city. 
General Policy Implementation 
A more common definition for the concept of administrative responsive-
ness is the ability of a government to provide those services which are desired by 
the electorate. Again it is suggested that citizen responsiveness to government is 
dictated largely by their expectations about government activity; however, 
where these expectations focused upon individual contact above, they also must 
be seen in relation to the making of policy as well. Responsiveness in this 
context, must be divided into two,phases. First, people must communicate their 
needs and desires to candidat!s an<f;,r_epresentatives who in turn must be recep-
tive if they are to retain their trusNmd interest. This is basically a question of 
political responsiveness and, while it is essential for the operation of any govern-
ment which desires citizen interest, is clearly outside the scope of this article. 
The development and implementation oLpolicies which are in the public 
interest also depend upon the relationship between the legislative body and the 
chief administrative officials. If they are not formulated coherently and clearly 
communicated to these officials it is probably the desires of the civic service 
itself rather than those of the people. Responsive administration depends upon 
the presence of a number of factors affecting legislative - executive relations-~ 
a) Useful information must be pro-
vided by the civic service to the leg-
islative body 
b) Close consultation must take place 
between the civic service and the 
legislative body 
c) Clear lines of authority must eman-
ate from the legislative body to the 
civic service 
d) Clear directives must be given by 
the legislative body 
e) Useful mechanisms for the main-
tenance of overall legislative control 
must be established 
The structures of the legislative body and the upper levels of the civic 
service may promote or impede the implementation of responsible policies. The 
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White Paper has suggested the creation of a central Council which would elect 
three administrative committees and an Executive Policy Committee. The ad-
ministrative committees, would act as the vehicles through which the three 
major administrative departments would report to the Council. They would 
supervise the work of the civic service and consider appropriate city legislation. 
The Executive Policy Committee would have a co-ordinating function, 
bringing together the information from the civic service, the recommendations 
of the other committees and the leadership of the Council as a whole, in order to 
arrive at appropriate legislative. proposals. The Committee system would be the 
center of power in the proposed system, since the Council as a whole is too large 
for effective operations. The White Paper does not make clear whether these 
bodies and the Mayor are to keep their offices for fixed terms or just for the 
period in which they maintain the confidence of the Council. 
Administrative leadership would be vested in an appointed Board of Com-
missioners, composed of a Chief Commissioner, a Commissioner of Finance, a 
Commissioner of Works and Operations and a Commissioner of Planning. The last 
three would act as the chief administrative officers of their respective divisions, 
reporting to the Council through the appropriate committees. The Chief Commis-
sioner would act to co-ordinate the activities of the line administrative officers as 
well as supervise a number of staff operations such as legal counsel and information 
processing. The Board as a whole including the Mayor as an ex-officio Commis-
sioner would oversee the Budget Bureau and recommend program alternatives to 
the Executive Policy Committee. Either the Board would meet as a whole with the 
Executive Policy Committee in this respect or the Chief Commissioner would act as 
a liaison. This broad description of the council-commissioner system of local gov-
ernment constitutes the background for a discussion of the five aforementioned 
factors in achieving responsiveness in policy implementation. 
The provision of useful information to Council received a considerable 
amount of attention in the White Paper. Structually the provincial government 
has suggested that a set of overlapping responsibilities for providing information 
to the Council be imposed upon the Commissioners through the creation of four 
strong policy and administrative Council committees to which the Commis-
sioners individually and as a whole must report. Presumably the Council commit-
tees to be created in the various "communities" would also aid in information-
gathering. A second method of gaining information was considered in the pro-
posal for the development of a system of "urban accounts" whi~h should better 
inform government and citizens about felt needs and previous accomplishments. 
These urban accounts are a prerequisite for a third method of gathering inform-
ation - through the institution of a planning-programming budgeting system. 
The White Paper, by its frequent references to plans, programs and priorities is at 
lea~t implicitly acknowledging the utility of such a budgeting system in leading 
to mformed policy decisions by the Council. 
Close consultation between the Council and the civic service is, structural-
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ly at least, not a problem in the provincial government's proposals. One might 
suggest, on the other hand, that consultation is so well provided for that other 
factors might be affected by the overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities of 
Council members and Commissioners. 
The structure, as presented in the White Paper, does not appear to clearly 
delineate the lines of authority from Council to the civic service. This would be 
especially true if the Council were to be composed of independent members, all 
wishing to have a voice in the determination and approval of policy. Conflicts 
between administrative committees and the Executive Policy Committee would 
seem to be inevitable, especially under a non-partisan council. Conflicts between 
the Mayor, the committees and the Chief Commissioner in different variations 
would also be probable. These would be lessened as the structures find their 
appropriate "places" in the system though these places would vary as individual 
personalities had their effect. The use of the single-member district for choosing 
representatives may both encourage these conflicts where largely independents 
are elected or non-partisan regulations are instituted. If partisan elections are 
encouraged the lines of authority may become considerably clearer. 
In a number of existing iities4~he area, notably Winnipeg itself, elections 
have been held at large for equivalent seats and a form of proportional represent-
ation is used to determine the victors. The single member district, with election by 
plurality vote, is common elsewhere and at the provincial and federal levels. The 
proportional representation method encourages the existence of small splinter 
groups and independents while the single-member district encourages the larger 
parties and makes possible party landslide victories out of all proportion to the 
votes they might receive. Normally in any legislative body using a single-member 
district system and containing more than two parties the parfy gaining over 33% of 
the total vote in an election will be over-represented in the legislative body and ones 
receiving less than 28% will tend to be under-represented. Given the tendency in 
the City of Winnipeg at present to support at least two "major parties", the Greater 
Winnipeg Election Committee (GWEC) and a city-level NDP, it would be surprising 
not to see a Council elected along partisan lines. 
With these two major parties contesting the elections a majority of seats 
will almost always be captured by one of them. This party would ensure the 
election of its leaders to the chairmanships of the administrative committees and 
to the rest of the posts on the Executive Policy Committee. Co-ordination of 
authority would then be established in caucus and the Council would speak to 
the Board of Commissioners with one voice. 
The provincial government has noted in its White Paper that this council-
commissioner system has worked successfully in other Western Canadian cities. 
It has been well-received in Saskatchewan and Alberta but the structures have 
been considerably different, especially in terms of the number of Commissioners 
and in the existence of strong committees which are empowered to oversee the 
civic service. On these grounds it would perhaps be best to reserve judgement 
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upon the utility of the proposed system in the area of clear and coherent 
direction. 
Council control over administrative action is envisioned in the White Paper 
as essentially limited to the power of appointment and the creation of an intern-
al auditor, responsible to the Council. 
Normally, city governments restrict themselves to actively appointing only 
such senior officials as the Commissioners and delegate further personnel duties 
to professional officers under the control of the Board itself. The Council should 
take particular concern that such a professional selection of members of the civic 
service not work to the detriment of any of the ethnic groups in the larger urban 
area and that sufficient attention is paid to the significance that the ·contact 
these employees make with the public, both in terms of personality and res-
idence. A deliberate personnel policy aimed at maintaining a local flavour to the 
city employees in any district wherever possible, should be formulated. 
The post of internal auditor is both sensible and necessary in any large 
government. In spite of complaints make publicly since the distribution of the 
White Paper about the cost of such an office, it is likely that such an official 
would save the city money many times over his salary. 
The White Paper also suggested a third mechanism for Council control of the 
civic service. This was to be part of the function of the Community Committee, 
composed of Councillors who represented specific ward making up a former 
"city". These Community Committees would meet to hear complaints and sug-
gestions from the residents of the former "city" and pass them on to the Council or 
the civic service for action. If a partisan election scheme is devised, which also per-
mits parties to "parachute" notables from other parts of Greater Winnipeg into an 
area, is permitted, the chances of effective representation of many areas will be 
reduced, either because of the unfamiliarity of the Councillor with his constit-
uency or because he is in the wrong party. The lack of power in such Committees 
will also mitigate against their being effectively utilized by attention being paid to 
local needs and complaints. In order to supplement the channels for protest open 
through Community Councils and to reduce the total workload of the Councillors 
the post of City Ombudsman might be created by Council. He would resister and 
investigate complaints about administrative activities, performing a function an-
alogous to that of the auditor with respect to fmances. Policy proposals and comp-
laints would still flow through the Community Committees whi.fe administrative 
complaints could be directed to the City Ombudsman. 
CONCLUSION * 
* For CONCLUSION please see page 46. 
(technical error) 
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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE PROJECTED 
PLANS FOR GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 
- Jim Cassidy 
In an argument which is essentially over the merits of one policy or an-
other one measurement for deciding should be a proper cost-benefit analysis. 
The ~olicy which has the least costs and the most benefits lo~ic~ly is the 
preferred alternative, at least on an economic basis. The most .sophisticated ~nd 
proven system of cost-benefit analysis is a form of the Planmng-Programrmng-
Budgeting System of PPBS, an economic approach which insists on concrete 
goals and measureable costs and benefits. According to the experts this. system 
has proven to work well in industry and in areas of defence budgetmg and 
planning. It is the system which is now being incorporated into the. federal 
government organization and even parts of provincial go;ernment operatw~s. Its 
utility is that it can, in certain instances, be used to decide on the best policy to 
be followed, provided of course; th.at all of these policies have the same c~early 
defined and concrete objectives; ~~all future implications can be clearly Ident-
ified; that all pertinent costs can b(( accurately determined; and that all outputs 
can be measured as accurately as possible. 
Clearly the PPB System has many advantages and makes it possible to deal 
very effectively with economic factors, but th~ people who use the system a:e 
among the first to admit its inability to deal effectively with political and social 
factors, because of its lack of the techniques necessary to measure them. As 
Bertram Gross and Michael Springer in their work on Social Indicators suggest, 
"among the weakest links in benefit-cost-output analysis is the lack of compar-
able, systematic and periodically gathered social data" .1 
The government policy paper on government reorganization proposed that 
a system of cost-benefit analysis - perhaps even social accounting will be intro-
duced. Unfortunately, no such system now exists to evaluate what has become a 
central issue in the debate on the proposals for reorganization namely; what will 
it cost. 
The problem arising out of the present discussion of amalgamation is how 
to assure for the people, the maximum benefits of government while reducing 
costs to ~he lowest possible point. And the question is, can all of the implic-
ations be identified and costs and benefits measured1 The economic costs of the 
required scheme of amalgamated services can be fairly effectively measured, .but 
this alone does not constitute an argument either for or against amalgamatiOn, 
unless the objective of amalgamation is a purely economic one. Since the objec-
tive as stated is a social, political and economic one, then in order to argue 
against it on a cost basis you must discuss the full range of social, political a~d 
economic costs and you must show exactly the social, political and economic 
benefits those costs are bringing. Because the benefits are difficult to quantify, 
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there is a tendency to say that there are no benefits. That is to say, to put forth 
the argument that the social and political factors are static and therefore the 
argument should be settled on the basis of the economic factors. 
This would seem a very simplistic attitude as social and political factors are 
very seldom, if ever, static. The fact that they are difficult to measure does not 
mean that they do not exist. 
Last year, the cities of Jacksonville and Duval County, Florida amalg-
amated under one government to produce the largest city in North America - an 
area of 800 square miles, and, according to the mayor, Hans Tanzler, "The most 
valuable benefit has been psychological." 
The problem then becomes how do you measure the psychological bene-
fits gained against the costs accrued? 
What value do you give to a lessening of tensions between citizens and 
government because of improved methods of communication? You can measure 
the costs of amalgamating, but how do you measure the cost, in terms of citizen 
alienation of not amalgamating? How do you measure the indirect long-term and 
short-term economic benefits of a cost factor that is pro-rated over a period of 
time? How do you measure the benefits arising from increased ability to fight 
fires, control pollution, handle traffic, promote industrial development, combat 
crime, relate to people, provide for more effective planning of growth and dev-
elopment? 
A discussion of costs is meaningless unless you can discuss the benefits 
arising from those costs. Ithas been said in economic terms that it would cost 
$18 million to carry out amalgamation, but it has not been said, in economic 
terms, how much the benefits are worth. Are they worth $1 million or $40 
million?- No one can say. 
For every economic cost, there is an economic, a social, and a political 
benefit - negative or positive - there is still a benefit. 
We can recognize that there is this multiplicity of benefits that need to be 
assessed, the problem is how to quantify them in order to compare them. To do 
this with the tools and techniques presently available is a formidable if not 
impossible task considering the primitive state of knowledge. Increasingly there 
is more sophisticated work being done by scholars such as Bertram Gross, Ray-
mond Bauer, and Eric Janstch, working in the field of social indicators. Hope-
fully, as well, the provincial government department of Urban Affairs will begin 
to explore new technicques of similar kind that can eventually be applied to the 
new government of Greater Winnipeg. 
Until then, however, the present arguments are somewhat akin to two 
small boys arguing over the length of a line. Until someone comes along with a 
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ruler the argument will never be settled. 
1. Bertram Gross, Michael Springer, "A New Orientation in American Gov-
ernment", The Annals, May 1967. 
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Party Politics and Regional Government 
- by Bill Burdeyny 
The province's proposal to introduce a regional government with fewer 
elected officials representing more people in Metro Winnipeg (as compared to 
existing local municipal councils) has created a common opinion that such a 
formation will result in "party politics at the :inunicipallevel." 
In past years, rarely did candidates in suburban municipal elections rely 
upon party affiliations and support to attain a seat on the local council. Also, 
there is no evidence that suburban council voting was ever conducted according 
to party lines. 
However, municipal leaders today are fearfully convinced that the White 
Paper is designed to import party politics at the municipal level with an objective 
of a majority of NDP members on the regional council. 
How much does the Manitoba NDP government stand to gain if party 
politics is introduced as suggested on the local scene? 
In an attempt to delve deeper into the growing convictions of municipal 
officials that party politics will be "the name of the game" in regional govern-
ment, one ought to determine the restrained or hidden political loyalties and 
affiliations of suburban council members. 
It could be said, after studying the statistics, that the NDP has much to 
gain and little to lose. Out of the 11 suburban councils with a total of 80 mayors 
and council members, only six incumbents are outright declared NDP standard 
bearers, 18 are Conservatives, 21 Liberals, one Social Credit and 19 Inde-
pendents. 
The high number of listed Independents include council members who 
refrain from exhibiting political affiliations or support for any particular party at 
the municipal level. Without a doubt, most of these Independents would fall into 
the Conservative or Liberal camp if open declarations were made - opinions 
expressed also emphasized that few if any would be classed as'bNDP members. 
If one considers all local government representatives in Metro Winnipeg -
including Winnipeg and Metro councils -the NDP members would hold 12 of 
the 112 seats, according to present estimated affiliations. 
While most municipal officials today feel party politics will become stand-
ard procedure in the proposed new government, some of them feel there would 
be a better chance getting elected to the regional council on a "Independent" 
ticket in the first and second year. 
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St. Boniface Alderman John Gee sees the White Paper as an objective plan 
by the government to transplant NDP partisans in local government. He calls the 
proposals a vehicle to establish an extension of the NDP provincial government. 
The partisan politics will force other candidates to become party support-
ed due to high financial costs involved in the election campaigns, contends Mr. 
Gee. 
In his opinion," ... one big council will not be possible to operate without 
party politics. With a 48-member council, you will devleop two factions - the 
majority and the opposition -like a rninature Legislature." 
Looking at the proposed 48-ward system, Mr. Gee concludes the concept 
was purposely designed to include NDP strongholds in parts of Metro Winnipeg 
which guarantee the regional council at least 16 NDP wards. 
North Kildonan Mayor Dave Pekary also foresees party politics generated 
by the regional form of government. Assessing what competition a candidate 
might face in the one-city elec.tionsJt:~.e is convinced the road to victory will be 
on an "Independent" label. .. ~ .~~· 
"This is the way to get elected ... the only way. Because most people will 
realize that party politics will not work at the municipal level. There becomes a 
loss of independence on civic decisions." 
The mayor of the proposed regional council would be representing 60 per 
cent of the province's population. In this respect, Mr. Pekary regards such a 
mayor as a "second premier" of the province. 
The expected party politics action in the regional government elections 
and responsibilities of elected members will automatically eliminate more than 
80 per cent of the incumbents in Metro Winnipeg councils, Mr. Pekary declared. 
"They would not be able to run because it will become a full-time job. 
There's no way they could afford to run for the central council unless the costs 
are subsidized, such as party support." 
In his mind, he civic field would be reduced to a chosen few, such as" ... 
teachers, welfare recipients and unemployed insurance agents." 
A noted voice on municipal government is Mayor Abe Yanofsky who 
shares similar opinions with Mr. Pekary and other municipal leaders. 
He is firmly convinced that an Independent candidate would draw more 
votes for a seat on the regional council than a party standard bearer. 
He expects the NDP will run a full slate of contenders in any regional 
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council election and the extent of party politics involved greatly depends on 
what the other political parties will do in the contests. 
Mr. Yanofsky also feels the government plan was specifically drafted to 
provide a cabinet-type of government and will result in camp alignments among 
sitting members. 
There will be a new trend in local elections under a one-city plan. The 
competition for· the 48-seats will make them beyond the reach of many incum-
bents due to time and money involved. This means there could be new faces in 
the civic arena .. new types of candidates. 
The West Kildonan mayor believes there would be candidates for the big 
council who are either in retirement, wealthy or self-employed - someone who 
can devote all their time to he job. 
"You definitely will not get many of the same type of people who are 
presently serving on municipal councils," he added. 
Today, there are 80 municipal council seats in the Metro suburban mun-
icipalities (not including the unfilled aldermanic position in St. Vital). 
The government's White Paper proposes creating 26 of the suggested 48 
wards in existing suburban area - the remaining 22 wards would be in Winnipeg. 
This means suburban representation will be reduced by 54 representatives. 
At the same time, Winnipeg would benefit in such a transition. The existing three 
ward-18 aldermen system would be expanded to 22 representatives in 22 wards. 
Mayor William Hanks of St. James-Assiniboia pointed out that Winnipeg 
sitting members on a regional council would only require support from three of 
the other wards to command a majority vote. 
To him, such an operation would develop into a Winnipeg dictatorship, 
once the majority has been achieved. 
The White Paper states that urban community is nothing more, nor less, 
than the sum of the people. It is the people who make the community -not 
merely the structural forms they have devised over the yea'i's to help them 
accomplish their common ends. Structural forms, governmental set-ups, all these 
things are meaningless except insofar as they serve the people who live within 
them. 
Which brings to focus the government's proposal - or call it a structural 
form -that Charleswood and Tuxedo form one of the48 wards. 
Mayor Clive Tallin stresses the potential impact of such a formation. Tux-
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edo today has four councillors and a mayor doing the civic service for the 
citizens. 
Under the White Paper proposal, Tuxedo could end up with no resident 
representative, and conceivably so. 
Using 1969 statistics and census totals, Charleswood with an 8,838 pop-
ulation could easily outvote the 3,100 residents of Tuxedo. 
By comparison, Tuxedo's total taxable assessment was $25.5 million 
whereas Charleswood totalled $18.3 million. Through Tuxedo's higher values in 
buildings, greater revenues and fiscal assets, the town could lose its local govern-
ment representation in a one-ward system. 
Party politics ... party votin_g ... could be a salvation for Tuxedo if a 
local candidate was able to draw support from voters in Charleswood by virtue 
of party loyalties. 
Voters in suburban mu@cipa~ies are accustomed to casting ballots "for 
the man" and not on the basis of "fb¥the party." 
Therefore the contention by municipal officials that an Independent label 
will be more successful in the regional government election than party cand-
idates, has some merit. 
In 1969 there was a concerted effort among NDP constituents to place 
party candidates in every Metro municipal election. But the objective was never 
reached. It appeared candidates were more inclined to present the Independent 
image at election campaigns than make a public declaration of party endors-
ation. 
Yet there are those, like Elswood Bole, a veteran in municipal government, 
who considers the Independent status as "very nice but naive." To him, no 
individual, no matter how right he may be, can accomplish anything on council 
without the support of his colleagues. 
There are many who think the same way as Mr. Bole that party politics 
can't help but make for better government, that it stimulates interest and gener-
ates competition ... some of the ingredients that make up the life of a larger 
council. 
The partisan action, if carried out in full force at the regional council level, 
could provide the spark of interest that apathetic voters need to become in-
volved at the polls. 
Party politics is destined to be a major effect of the White Paper in mun-
icipal voting. 
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Ther~ is _another aspect which may be caused by the White Paper and push 
party pohilcs mto the background. That is suburban resistance to the central 
city plan. 
The 11 suburban municipal councils - made up of varied political follow-
ers in one way or another - are capable of organizing into a solid front against 
the government proposals. 
. In an all-out fight, the municipal councils are apt to cast aside political 
leanmgs and wear the more common cloak of nonpartisan council member. In 
short, the elected representatives would fight in the manner they are more 
accustomed to performing duties ... as individuals working toward a common 
goal. 
Amalgamations on a smaller scale are considered more politically feasible 
~ha~ the overnight changeover from 12 municipalities to one big city. The prov-
mcial government displays an air of confidence that this plan is what the people 
want ... Without even depending on a referendum for the feelings of the people. 
. The battle to preserve what took many hard years of municipal living may 
kmt the suburban officials into an effective objecting voice of the people. 
. You c~~ b.e sure _there will be a fight and in the heat of exchanges, party 
lmes and afflhat10ns will be forgotten. Take St. James-Assiniboia which by care-
ful fi~ancing earned approximately $1 million in revenues through its revolving 
fund m 1970. And that revolving fund looks good to any future mate of the 
city, including Winnipeg, particularly when it is in excess of $7 million. This is 
worth fighting for. 
But in the end, the provincial government will implement its White Paper 
plan and politics will make its full-scale introduction in the municipal suburban 
affairs. 
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Public response to the Boundaries Question 
-by Gerry Haslam 
For years, and especially since the advent of the Metro System in 1961, 
urban boundaries - and their implications for taxpayers -have been the subject 
of heated debate and fervent opinion among many Winnipeggers. Especially in 
the City of Winnipeg proper there has been a high level of anti-Metro feeling, at 
least until very recently. But attitudes have been changing, particularly with the 
development of downtown Winnipeg and the realization by many citizens that a 
comprehensive system of urban planning must be undertaken in any metro-
politan area. Nonetheless, most politicians and commentators fully believed that 
the report of the boundaries commission and the subsequent release of the 
government white paper would produce widespread public response and discus-
sion. It was reasoned that since the people of the Winnipeg area municipalities 
have always taken considerable - if sometimes parochial - pride in their com-
munities, these people would react vigorously to suggestions of change, especial-
ly to the suggestion that the ~nici9fllities amalgamate or unify. 
:~~~ 
The simple fact is iliat it hasn't happened. The 'man in the street' has been 
very slow to react to both the commission report and the white paper. Less than 
a year ago an adjustment in assessments of property in sections of the City of 
Winnipeg produced an overwhelming outcry. Bu..t now, proposals which may, in 
the opinion of some, increase property taxes by as much as $100 per house on 
the average has met with the equivalent of a blank stare from the citizenry. 
Municipal politicians, academics, editorialists and broadcasters have been quick 
to prove the white paper, but public reaction has been incredibly lacking. The 
evidence indicates that taxpayers are interested, but, for the moment, they're 
aloof. It seems that what is needed is a catalyst for public involvement. 
Given the low level of response from people who have usually - and 
recently -been deeply involved in public issues (as for instance with Bill 56 in 
mid-1970 and with capital punishment late in the year) two questions come to 
mind: first, why ilie low level response, and second; will it continue? 
The most obvious answer to the first question is that ilie boundaries 
question at this stage is emmensely complicated by the appearance of two con-
flicting reports. Indeed, it is complicated in any event, even if there was only one 
report. No longer is there a simple question to be answered by policy-maker and 
public alike, a question like 'Do we want one big city?', or 'Should we get rid of 
Metro?' It was never that simple, but, over the years the news media in Winnipeg 
has consistently presented to the public just that kind of simplistic view, pos-
sibly because news editors and writers never understood all the implications 
themselves. The whole question of boundaries was conveniently reduced to its 
lowest denominator by the media and left that way. With the appearance of 
complex reports, the media made an initial attempt to simplify again, and failed. 
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Over the period of days after the appearance of the white paper, the media 
seemed to realize that the issues involved could not be resolved in a few neat 
phrases, nor could they be understood by the public through the kind of shoddy 
reporting which has characterized the media generally. Unlike their treatment of 
Bill 56, where public involvement reached possibly an all-time high, the media 
chose to hedge its bets, with the result that the people it exists to serve probably 
went away confused. 
The performance of the media in the case of the boundaries commission 
report and the white paper was very poor, more so with the latter. The Smellie 
report was generally dismissed as a flop, without much further reference to the 
depth of the issues involved. For some strange reason, the media seemed con-
fidently to expect that the government policy paper would clear up the 'mess', 
and lay out a one-city plan in clear terms -clear, that is, in terms of simplicity. 
Accordingly, when the government pre-released the paper, under the usual news 
embargo, a day early, few newsmen, it would appear, took the time to read it. 
Judging from the calibre of questions at the Schreyer-Cherniack news conference 
on the day the embargo was lifted, the paper might never have been pre-released 
at all. Coverage of the government's proposals was extensive in terms of quan-
tity, but it lacked both depth and quality. It may also be true that the govern-
ment designed and timed the report's presentation to minimize public response, 
but of course the government would deny that. 
Given the media's failure to inform the public properly, the vague response 
should not be surprising. But there is another factor. Both public officials and med-
ia commentators have been extremely slow in 'hard' reactions to the white paper. 
Everyone, it seems, is hedging their bets, waiting to sense the volume of citizen 
response. Unfortunately, the taxpayers, who are used to being able to choose view-
points which have been enuniciated by others, seemed to be waiting for reaction 
from their leaders. This double-barrelled vacuum appears to be feeding on itself. 
When the subject to be analyzed is public response to an issue, there are 
two measuring criteria - 'breadth' and 'depth'. Breadth refers to the attention 
span of the public -how long will they continue to discuss an issue before going 
on to something more interesting. Depth is a different thing; it refers to the depth 
of knowledge amassed by the average citizen about a given issue. Bill 56 is the 
best example of both criteria - the argument went on for months, and the 
average citizen's knowledge, considering the complexity of the issue, was incred-
ibly good. In the past, urban boundaries, as an issue, has had gt'eat breadth, but 
little depth. At the moment it seems to have neither, but it is beginning to show 
signs of exhibiting more depth than breadth; many people seem content to wait 
to respond, which may indicate that when they do respond it will be on the basis 
of rnore knowledge than they might presently be expected to have. 
So what is likely to happen? 
It is difficult to belive that response from the general public will remain at 
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the present low ievel. With the appearance in the media of articles and other 
features further explaining the issue, some response has begun to trickle in. The 
important facet of that response is that is reflect considerable thought on the 
part of those citizens concerned. On the basis of the fragmentary returns at the 
moment it would appear that while there is unlikely to be great breadth of 
response on this issue the depth of response will be impressive. The public has 
been slow to get involved, but since the media and the politicians now seem to 
be taking a more mature view of the issue in terms of its complexity; we can 
expect more public involvement. But until the matter reaches the floor of the 
legislature, it is doubtful that the issue will have any major impact. Whether that 
is due to accident or shrewd planning on the part of the government remains to 
be seen, but it will be most unfortunate if the issue fails to develop in a public 
sense. There is even an outside chance that the new boundaries of metropolitan 
Winnipeg will be settled without any active involvement- except in an indirect 
way - of the taxpayers. 
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A Private Citizen's Point of View 
-by Mr. Carson Templeton 
I agree completely with the government's thread running through the 
White Paper that it is absolutely essential for good government to be closely 
related to the people. In my opinion this is by far the most important aspect, 
and one that should take precedence over costs, efficiency or anything else. I 
also feel very strongly that municipal government is the only real contact that 
people have with democracy, because the other levels of government are too 
remote. Unless people feel that they can have a say in democracy, and that they 
will be listened to, then they will tend either to pay no attention to government, 
or to take the law into their own hands - a situation that is prevalent in many 
large cities of the world. This lack of communication is simply brought about by 
our political system failing t9 grow with the development of the cities. In this 
philosophy, I agree with the White Paper completely. But I disagree almost as 
completely that the structure proposed in the White Paper will actually improve 
communication. I believe that it would make the government considerably more 
remote than it presently is. 
The White Paper, in my opinion, make certain assumptions which are not 
valid. Page one, in the "Purpose of This Statement" it states: " ... this area now 
lacks the governmental structures to make it an effectively functioning entity" 
In my opinion this is incorrect. True, there are personality and staff problems 
between the municipal and the metro government and the provincial govern-
ment; between various provincial government; and between the provincial and 
federal government. No structure is ever going to get rid of personality problems, 
nor should it. The democratic system depends on balances and criticism. Our 
universities and democratic institutions are based on freedom of thought and 
expression, which automatically produce dissension; but rather than destroying 
the institutions, the dissension and testing make them stronger. 
There are some who say, "Give me the job of administering the whole area 
and I will do it better". And for a short time they might do so. But this is a line 
used by all benevolent dictators; dictatorship is not democracy. 
There seems to be an impetuousness of any new government that it can 
correct all of the faults of the past without perhaps studying''the good points. 
For example, the Liberal government commissioned the Metropolitan Invest-
igating Committee, which studied the problems of local government for four 
years and came up with a proposal for metro government. Since the government 
had changed by the time the committee presented its report, the Conservative 
government in its wisdom did not accept the recommendations of the committee 
and came out with its own. I believe that in doing so they missed a fundamental 
recommendation which, if it had been adopted, would have related the Metro-
politan Corporation much better to the people; this was representation of the 
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municipalities on the Metropolitan Council. 
Subsequently, the Conservative government formed the Local Boundaries 
Commission, which after years of study, presented its report. Again, a change of 
government has taken place. The N. D.P. government does not want to use the 
findings of this commission and would rather come up with its own. To me, 
both of these cases demonstrate an improvidence that is possibly based on lack 
of knowledge, or possibly is influenced by individuals who in trying to correct 
some things fail to realize the total picture and perhaps do not fully understand 
precisely what is being done in municipal government. 
In the course of my some 15 years working with municipal councils, I have 
built up a tremendous respect for the dedication and ability of the municipal 
councillors. I do not agree that the politicians and officials of the government 
proposed by the White Paper would be "qualitatively better". 
If I thought the Community committees proposed in the White Paper 
would relate to the people, I co~d accept them. But I do not see how any 
committee can perform any ~efuljyork if it has neither a budget, authority, or 
responsibility to do anything. Such~inmittees will become inoperative in a very 
short time, and hence be completely useless. This has been the experience with 
the Consultative Committee set up by th,e Metro Act. 
If these Community committees could pe given authority and respon-
sibility, I think the structure might be workable. But they must be given author-
ity and responsibility for things that matter, not just "community centres, local 
parks, playgrounds, libraries and local recreation facilities." 
Throughout, the White Paper passes comments, such as the individual 
citizen's frustration because he is alienated. I feel that these are generalizations. 
If he feels frustrated or threatened, it is more likely because of bureaucracy, 
because he cannot feel a sense of participation, or because he is paying more 
taxes than he feels he should. I doubt whether he is alienated because of the 
form of government. 
The average person does not always recognize what his taxes represent or 
what municipal government does for him. He does not see the need for a fire 
department until he has a fire; a policeman until he has Trouble; snow plows 
except when it snows. 
The news media, (and I do not single out the local media,) report the 
unusual, and are quick to print news stories about municipal bickering. Com-
ments on bickering have a cumulative effect, so that readers eventually believe 
that all that municipal government does is bicker. Yet I have never found anyone 
closely allied to municipal government who says that bickering is a factor in 
municipal government, and this has also been my experience. There are, of 
course, personality clashes, but these occur in any organization. 
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The White Paper goes on to talk about equity in three areas. i.e., services, 
administration and mill rate. For many years local government has supplied 
many of the -essential services. The level of service is different in each mun-
icipality but in reality this does not reflect the desire of the people to keep their 
standard and thus their costs down to the level which they feel they can afford. 
If an individual is required to pay a mill rate higher than what he has been 
accustomed then the immediate result will be a demand for a level of servicing 
equal to the highest standard. 
There are those who argue that everyone should have the same degree of 
servicing. The same argument could be used that everyone should have a Cadillac 
because some people have them. But if in spending all your money on an 
expensive car you are depriving yourself of essentials, then it may not be worth-
while. Similarly, in municipal government, any time the cost of services go up 
automatically a number of people are prevented from buying homes and some 
existing home owners must reduce their standard of living to pay the additional 
taxes. 
I think people should have the opportunity to vote on their local improve-
ments and acquire only those local improvements they think, on a community 
basis, are necessary. When there is a uniform mill rate over the whole area the 
people no longer feel they are paying for what they are getting but feel that the 
more they can get from "those other guys", the better. This must raise the cost 
of servicing throughout the whole area. 
If my mathematics is correct the White Paper suggest that 80% of the 
population would have no change, or a decrease in mill rate in 1970. It would 
seem to me that this was achieved by averaging mill rates without regard to 
assessment. Taxes are based on mill rate and assessment and to consider one 
without the other gives an incomplete answer. 
Similarly, a unification of local government staff will result in elevating all 
staff salaries to the level of the dominant group. This is demonstrated well in the 
Boundaries Commission Report. 
There is no question in my mind, that after the experience of admin-
istrative costs when Metro was formed, when St. James-Assiniboia was amalg-
amated, as well as the experiences in Toronto a,nd elsewhere, that costs will rise 
very substantially with the amalgamation proposed by the White !>aper. 
A Council of some 48 members will be a very unwieldy organization. I 
shudder to think of the time it will take to arrive at decisions. Because of its size 
it will of necessity become a party system of government where there is a party 
in power, an opposition and the organizational set up of the provincial govern-
ment. If this is what is wanted then it should be clearly spelled out and proper · 
checks and balances built in so that it can operate in the time honored par-
liamentary system. 
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I do not agree that a Party System of government js the proper system at 
the municipal level. The reason is the same as the main thread of reasoning 
throughout this paper. Municipal Government is the main link of the people 
with Democracy. It is the one link by which people feel that they can par-
ticipate. This link should not be broken by power politics, forgotten back bench-
ers, influence by outsiders or other pressures of the Party System. In the subur-
ban municipalities today although Councillors are members of various political 
parties, decisions are made without regard to party politics. In my opinion 
municipal government decisions should continue to be made this way. 
In summary, I feel that to completely change the democratic system at the 
municipal level with such haste is unwise. The present system has evolved over 
the years, it has its defects but it has one paramount advantage - people par-
ticipate. Starting a new system without the understanding of its ramifications 
including costs and acceptance of the people is reckless. 
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CONCLUSION 
It would appear that if the provincial government's proposals are adopted 
at least one ran~e of urban problems, those related to fragmentation of authorit; 
and fmances, will be solved. These solutions will not likely be any less expensive 
for the taxpayers, though many will derive increased direct benefits and most 
other_s some increase in indirect benefits. It is doubtful that the larger admin-
IstratiOn will prove to be any less efficient that those presently in existence. 
. ~he White Paper would appear to be at its weakest in meeting its aim of 
mcrea_smg or at least m~intaini~g citizen responsiveness. In stressing the priority 
of efficient_ comprehensive services the provincial government may be repeating 
the lesson It presumably had learned - and expressed in the quote from the 
~~te Pape_r _which began this article. Both the responsiveness engendered by 
Citlzen-admimstrator contact and through policy implementation are threatened 
by a partial lack of realistic safeguards and an overstressing of one set of prob-
l~~s, those due to fragmentation, at the expense of other potential ones, such as 
CitiZen apathy. The government, for all its good intentions, may well find it has 
tra~ed off the one for the other. Hopefully, this danger will consciously be 
avoided m the forthcoming legislation. 
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Conclusion: TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC CITY 
- by Lloyd Axworthy 
Perhaps the most serious dilemma of modern day government is'whether it 
is possible to balance the requirements of efficiency and effectiveness with the 
need for democratic control and responsibility. Our complex urban society 
needs sophisticated knowledge, highly-trained professional skills and complic-
ated administrative systems to properly manage our affairs. Yet, people should 
be involved in decision-making and should be able to exercise the rights and 
privileges of democratic citizenship. But, how is it possible for people to have 
control over their own affairs if they do not possess specialized information, 
understand complicated technical problems or know how to deal with the intric-
acies of modern day bureaucracies? 
The traditional trappings of democracy - elected councils, secret ballot, 
public hearings, appeal boards, basic rights of free speech and assembly are not 
sufficient in giving people re,fll inv\}lvement. If you apply some basic measure-
ments on how well these stn.\cturet:iwork, then it is quite apparent that we only 
have the form not the substance of democracy in our city. Very few people are 
really informed on the decisions being made in local government. Very few have 
access to the decision-makers. Very few vote. Very few participate. 
It is easy to say that these things happen because people are apathetic. But 
if this is true should we not ask why people are apathetic? Apathy affects people 
if they have no idea what is happening in government. In a survey conducted by 
the Institute of Urban Studies in a downtown area of our city, it was found that 
less than 5% of the residents had any knowledge of several major decisions 
affecting their area that had been taken by various local government bodies. 
Once they received information, they became interested and many became in-
volved in trying to change those decisions. For all the massive apparatus of 
modern mass media, communication is a primary problem. Too many decisions 
are taken and too many policies made without the slightest awareness by those 
who will be affected. 
What about elections? It is a common place of civic elections that voters 
hardly know who they are voting for, or have any contact with aldermen once 
they are elected. Again, another survey by the Institute revealed that less than 
10% of a sample population ever had any reference to their local representative, 
and furthermore, the elected representative was not looked upon as anyone to 
call upon for assistance. When aldermen are chosen from large area constit-
uencies, such as the ward system in Winnipeg, an alderman can be selected by a 
small proportion of voters drawn from only one part of the total constituency. 
As a result, citizens from the rest of the area are basically unrepresented. It is 
therefore, something of a mockery to suggest that elections in local government 
offer much choice, or lead to adequate representation. 
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A contributing cause to this separation of people from elected represent-
atives can be traced to the non-partisan form of local politics. There is a strange 
mythology, held by many people that there is no place for party politics at the 
local level. We cherish the ideal of independent, free thinking men on local 
council. Unfortunately, it does not work that way. The political scientist Charles 
Adrian compared cities which had party political systems to those that had 
non-partisan systems and reached the following conclusions: 
1) Non-partisanship encourages the avoidance of issues of policy; 
2) Non-partisanship tends to frustrate protest voting; 
3) Non-partisanship produces a legislative body which has limited changes in 
membership, thus making for conservatism; 
4) There is no collective responsibility in a non-partisan body, resulting in the 
lack of a comprehensive legislative program. I 
If people cannot discern real choices between those whom they elect, then 
they are not apt to be interested. Therefore, even though there may be elected 
councils made up of decent respectable men, there is little sense of relationship 
or confidence between the representative and the citizen, and very little compet-
ition between different points of view. 
Perhaps most serious, however, is the inequality of decision-making that 
exists in the local government arena. Administration of the city is too often a 
privilege exercised by professional administrators and a few strong organizations. 
Government administrators are at the center of the decision-making system. 
They possess the information, the data and the time to work out the policy. 
Basically, the elected representative just responds to initita tives of the civil ser-
vant as there are few other sources of competing policy ideas or knowledge. 
Citizens must rely upon what they are told, as they have no basis for opposition. 
When a plan for renewal or parks or downtown development is presented, who 
can offer an alternative? Yet, it may be that the proposed policy reflects the 
interests and outlooks of the administrator, and may be contrary to the best 
interests of the communtiy. When one looks at the drastic failures and wasteful 
programs of urban renewal that were the pet schemes of the administrative 
experts over the years, then serious doubts about the wisdom of many govern-
ment enterprises must be raised. 
There are some groups in the community who are in a position to interact 
with government officials in an equal way. Certain professional groups such as arch-
itects, certain industry groups such as realtors or developers, and certain well-
organized interest groups such as the Chamber of Commerce or the unions can and 
do represent their point of view, and can gain concessions and changes in policies 
and programs. They have the time, the resources, and the personal association with 
the civic officials that enable them to influence policy. Unfortunately this is not 
true for many urban residents who are not represented by a group and who cannot 
command high priced professional help to represent them at public hearings or 
council meetings. Therefore, we end up with a form of elitism. 
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Other evidence could be added, but the troublesome fact is clear ~ there is 
a serious weakness in the democratic conduct of local government. As Roscoe 
Martin concludes in his book Grass Roots city hall is just as unreachable as the 
far distant national capital. In consequence, there is a danger that not only will 
decisions increasingly be taken by an elite, but that the frustrations of ordinary 
citizens will result in either a deep set detachment from the governing process, or 
an accelerating trend toward protest politics and open confrontation. If either 
situation prevails, then the ability of our community to meet the critical urban 
issues of the future is held in doubt: 
The New Structure 
The provincial government has presented a series of proposals that it 
claims will meet these problems. The question of whether they have the right 
answer is of primary importance. 
First, it should be recognized that no new structure of government can be 
itself guarantee the existence of democracy. As many modern political analysts 
have pointed out, the maintenWJ_ce at a democratic community is only partially 
affected by the legal framework a~d organization of government. Far more 
critical are such factors as economic stability, the distribution of political power, 
the attitudes and values of the population. One need only be reminded that the 
most perfectly devised constitution, containing the best arranged democratic 
system of government was that drawn up in Germany after World War I. But, it 
could not withstand the pressures created by the severe social and economic 
divisions that tortured that country and was of little use in inhibiting the take-
over of Nazism. Thus, one should not expect that a magic wave of the wand by 
the provincial legislature will produce a fool-proof system of effective democ-
ratic government for metropolitan Winnipeg. 
But, it can make a difference. The kind of framework established by the 
provincial government will either produce a system that will enhance the tend-
ency toward centralized non-democratic rule or apply a brake to these tend-
encies and provide for a more open, reponsive system. The government's pro-
posals should, thus, be tested on the basis of how well they promote the latter 
development. 
Metropolitanism 
To begin with, the basic reorganization of existing municipalities into a 
metropolitan-regional government can lead to both positive and negative effects. 
A metropolitan government, by eliminating fragmentation of services, insuring a 
more equitable distribution of finances, reducing competition between mun-
icipalities for industry, and providing for area-wide planning should be able to 
offer a higher degree of services and thus provide a greater degree of satisfaction 
for citizens. The fact of the matter is that many urban problems, particularly 
those dealing in matters of land use, environmental control and industrial dev-
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elopment are of such a scale that regional government is required and these 
functions encompass such a range of activities that it is unwise to separate them 
on a two-tier basis. There will be increasing demands in the future for regional 
size activities and there should be an appropriate instrument of government to 
deal with the problem. 
This raises the question of costs. Will the improvement in services justify 
the costs involved? Answers to that are not easy. You cannot apply the simple 
bookkeeping procedures of measuring increases in costs that will be incurred 
through amalgamation. ·The system of measurement must also include means of 
analysing the additional benefits and the overflow advantages of an amalgamated 
administration which takes one into the complicated field of social indicators 
and measurement of quality in programs. The fact of the matter is that there 
really is no satisfactory way yet devised of analysing real costs against both open 
and hidden benefits of government services. How, for example, can you measure 
in quantifiable terms the advantages to be gained in improved industrial dev-
elopment programs that could result from a unified regional government or the 
enhanced capacity of a regional government to control pollution? Therefore, the 
issue of costs must not be debated in simplistic terms. What the provincial 
government should be doing between now and the introduction of the new 
scheme is start developing a system of policy evaluation and program effect-
iveness so that costs oflocal government can properly be assessed. 
There is, however danger in becoming too mesmerized by the prospect of 
this higher degree of effectiveness. Regional government can become like a dino-
saur - with a large body and a small head, leading to clumsiness, unrespon-
siveness and disregard of local interests. A regional form of government can 
become a system of government that serves only the most privileged and power-
ful interest in a city, or a system that reflects the values and outlooks primarily 
of the professional administrator. Francis Fox Piven of Columbia, an urban 
social planner feels that regional government swallows up the poor and minor-
ities of the central city and only serves the suburban affluent. He further con-
cludes that such a system "gives substantial decision-making authority to experts 
who sit in the upper reaches of metropolitan wide bureaucracies, connected by a 
network of plans and programs to lesser functional bureaucracies. "2 
The provincial government policy takes note of this danger, but asserts 
that the system of ward representation and community committees provides an 
off-setting mechanism that will cater to local interests and courlter the power of 
centralized administration. This is where the gamble exists. If the provincial 
government is right, then they will have succeeded as few other governments 
have in blending regional administration with decentralized decision-making. 
The government asserts that the key to the plan is what they awkwardly 
call "community committees". These committees composed of aldermen from 
several wards inside a designated boundary are really replacements for the exist-
ing municipalities. If one looks at the boundaries for the community commit-
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tee's, they parallel those of present municipalities. They are in effect forms of 
municipal councils, except that they only exercise delegated authority from the 
larger Regional Council. The obvious question to ask is whether this is really an 
improvement? If people felt distant and out of touch with Winnipeg City Coun-
cil, why should they necessarily feel more involved with the Winnipeg Com-
munity Committee which is an exact duplicate. In effect, these are not really 
"community" committees. One could challenge the degree of community that 
exists between residents of River Heights and those of the North End of Win-
nipeg, even though they will both be part of the same committee. The concept 
of the committee system seems to be an exercise in giving a new name to an 
exisiting organization, but dissolving its ability to exercise independent powers. 
Neighbourhood City Halls 
It is useful to compare this idea of the community committee to the idea 
of "neighbourhood city halls'' that has been implemented in several American 
cities. The idea for neighbourhood city halls appeared in the Report of the Civil 
Disorder Commission. The Report proposed a two-stage process beginning with 
the creation of neighbourhoG-d taSE-forces composed of both residents, city 
officials and the local politicians. Til task forces would co-ordinate delivery of 
services and identify neighbourhood needs. The second stage would be the trans-
formation of the task forces into neighbourhood city halls, complete with their 
own decision-making powers. 
~ 
Mayor John Lindsay partially implemented this system in New York 
where he set up neighbourhood action centers which are staffed around the 
clock by a combination of city officals and neighbourhood residents. The most 
advanced experimentation has occurred in Boston where there are some thirteen 
neighbourhood city halls working out of portable trailors. They handle thous-
ands of requests, complaints and initiate programs for neighbourhood libraries, 
health clinics and recreation facilities. These city halls work on a small neigh-
bourhood scale, and have at least so far succeeded in developing some sense of 
local democracy. As Donald Canty, an urban commentator has observed about 
the system, 
"The little city functions much as the ward 
bosses office once did, and there is evidence 
that they are gradually changing the neigh-
bourhood residents' feelings about their gov-
ernment ... They are also changing if slowly 
and gradually neighbourhood bureaucracy. 
The little city hall staffs feel personally res-
ponsible to the neighbourhoods they serve. 
They become neighbourhood advocates and 
push city agencies for responses") 
This brings us to the ward system of representation contained in the 
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proposals. Here is a much more exciting potential for giving life and meaning to 
democracy at the local level. The wards, in the first instance, parallel much 
closer the definition of community, than the community committees. They are 
smaller in scale and tend to group people who fall into similar economic and 
social conditions. The ward is also small enough that representatives or aldermen 
selected from the area will have to reflect more directly the diverse interests of 
people in the city. In Toronto, when they changed to a small ward system, the 
opportunity for minority groups and under-represented people to gain a voice 
was much easier. Thus, the new forty-eight man council should provide a much 
more accurate reflection of the interests and outlooks of people in this city and 
give representation to many people who formally had no power to elect one of 
their own because the arena of competition was just too big. 
Of even greater potential is the opportunity the ward system offers to 
create brand new institutions of neighbourhood decision-making. One of the 
great failures of the present local government is that it is not concerned with the 
small but important problems that are neighbourhood based, nor is it able to 
identify the particular and peculiar wants and requirements of people in small 
areas of the city. As a result many problems are ignored or are dealt with in a 
universal city-wide fashion - just like the army used to issue every soldier the 
same size of overcoat whether it fitted or not. 
Some experiments conducted by our Institute have demonstrated the pos-
sibility of creating neighbourhood development corporations where people can 
take responsiblity for making decisions and initiating development in behalf of 
their own community. The existence of wards, representing a scale of about 
10,000 people could provide a governmental framework in which a number of 
community people could become involved in the identifying of problems, the 
planning of policy, and the implementing of programs which are of particular 
need to that neighbourhood. At the same time, there would be a direct linkage 
through the alderman to the regional government so that there could be worked 
out a harmony in the plans and priorities of the small community and the 
regional community. 
It is the ward system, therefore, which offers the most rewarding avenue 
of exploration in developing counter forces to centralization. They are of the 
proper scale, and more nearly fit the concept of decentralization, as the Amer-
ican experience with neighbourhood city halls seems to indicate. The Com-
munity Committee System may have some utility, but it would be wise to 
re-think whether the emphasis in the proposals should not be placed more on the 
ward - neighbourhood concept. 
A New Politics 
Ultimately, the success or failure of the new structure of local government 
will rest on the quality and kind of political leadership that emerges. The div-
ision of the city into forty-eight wards with the mayor and members of the 
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executive committee chosen by a majority vote will mean that the existing 
pattern of local non-partisan politics will not survive. The conditions are n~w 
ripe for a new form of coalition to emerge that will contend for contr.ol o.f ~1ty 
government on an organized base. In effect, the system will work m Slillilar 
fashion to the Cabinet-parliamentary arrangements that now exist at the prov-
incial and federal levels, where a majority chooses its leaders who must continue 
to maintain their confidence. 
This does not mean that political parties of the traditional variety are 
necessarily the answer. In Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, there have dev-
eloped new civic parties devoted to reform, running candidates under clear cut 
programs. They have begun to make serious inroads in changing the style and 
approach of local politics and are succeeding in changing the character of local 
government. The merit of this kind of new civic political formation is that it 
brings together many groups and individuals who are dissatisfied with the pre-
sent system and is able to weld together minority groups, middle-class profes-
sionals, certain voluntary associations who rally behind the common objective of 
instilling new life into the city. 
The advantages of this;kind4f political organization are several. They 
overcome many of the weaknesses of the traditional party structures. But at the 
same time they are able to offer clear programs of choice and present well-
defined alternatives so that people know what they are voting for. 
If some form of civic parties do not emerge, we will be left with a system 
similar to what exists now. Councillors will sort themselves out roughly along N.D. 
P. - non-N. D. P.lines and the new regional council would be dominated by shift-
ing arrangements and alliances of individuals acting without any clear-cut man-
date, or offering any clear direction of policy. The mayor and executive com-
mittee would be forced to play the game of survival politics and compromise 
with so many conflicting interests that they could not provide strong leadership. 
It would be as if the provincial government was handing the citizens of Winnipeg 
a brand new ship, but we recruited the same old crew to run it. 
To a large degree, the capacity of the provincial government's proposals to 
create a modern up-to-date system of local government that will overcome the 
technocratic tendencies of our existing system depends on the way in which the 
political process is organized. The proposed framework presents the possibility 
for a new politics. If it is not pursued, and the new framework is allowed to be 
governed by the old politics then little will be gained and a great deal lost. 
This is where the plea for citizen involvement, contained in the govern-
ment's proposals make sense. The new framework of government opens the 
opportunity for forgoing a new coalition of citizens who have hopes for building 
a good city and creating a more democratic way of governing our affairs. That 
means tough work in preparing and promoting new political ideas, and establish-
ing a new organization to carry them through. This is the real meaning of the 
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involvement and the 4inge upon which the plan will or will not work. The best 
advice to be heeded by people in this city as we prepare for a new form of 
government is the one inscribed 2,500 years ago as the motto of the city-state of 
Athens: 
"If the people cease to man the walls 
The city ceases to survive" 
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